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In this brief commentary, I shall defend two related points, one about colors, the 
other about color appearances. 
Maloney defines intrinsic color in two non-equivalent ways, first in terms of 
photoreceptor excitations, and second as a kind of reflectance property. As we shall see, 
the definition in terms of photoreceptor excitations (eq. 4 on p. 11 [IN THE DRAFT I 
HAVE]) faces more than one problem. Maloney’s definition of intrinsic colors as 
reflectance properties that correspond to the linear-models-weights representation of 
surface reflectances fares much better, though, as we shall see, it faces problems of its 
own. 
Consider the first proposal. Photoreceptor excitations are not intrinsic properties 
(here meaning local properties; properties that are not relations to perceivers) of distal 
surfaces, nor do they represent any such property. Instead, photoreceptor excitations 
represent sensor quantum catches (Maloney and Wandell, 1986, p. 29). Sensor quantum 
catches are not intrinsic but perceiver-dependent properties of perceived objects. The 
reason is that sensor quantum catches require the existence of perceivers. Were there no 
perceivers, there would be no sensor quantum catches. Color objectivism is the view that 
the existence of object colors does not depend on the existence of perceivers. So a color 
objectivist cannot maintain that object colors are sensor quantum catches, on pain of 
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inconsistency. Thus, this first proposal is incompatible with Maloney’s espoused color 
objectivism. 
The proposal faces additional problems. First, even if we keep the illuminant 
constant as Maloney suggests on p. 11 [IN THE DRAFT] we can only do so on arbitrary 
grounds, for there are many different illuminants that we might equally well choose as 
the reference illuminant. Second, on this proposal, intrinsic color depends on 
photoreceptor sensitivity profiles
2
, and such profiles are known to substantially vary from 
one trichromat human to another (Lutze et al., 1990; Neitz and Neitz, 1998; Hardin, 
1988, 76-82, and Fig. II-5A-B on p. 77). So even if we were to decide, for mathematical 
purposes, to keep them constant, the intrinsic color of any particular object in any 
particular fixed circumstance (reference illuminant, surround, etc.) will vary between 
normal trichromat human perceivers (Kuehni, 2001; Jakab, 2001; see also Block, 1999). 
To summarize, if intrinsic color is identified with photoreceptor excitations, then 
intrinsic color depends on properties of observers in such a way that particular colors 
cannot be specified without mentioning some characteristics of observers (i.e., their 
photoreceptor excitations), nor can they be physically instantiated in the absence of 
observers. Since, intuitively, intrinsic colors should be local properties of the distal 
objects of perception, this is a controversial result. 
 The second proposal for intrinsic color (representation of surface reflectances by 
linear models: basis functions and weights: p. 13 IN THE DRAFT) fares better. The idea 
here is that the basis functions of linear models mirror some fundamental, universal 
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reflectance characteristics of terrestrial surfaces.
3
 These fundamental reflectance 
characteristics in turn derive from some general physical and chemical properties of those 
surfaces (Maloney, 1986, pp. 1677-1678). Color vision represents particular reflectances 
by linear combinations of a small set of basis functions. If we identify intrinsic colors 
with the fundamental reflectance characteristics that human color vision is sensitive to, 
we avoid the above controversy about perceiver dependence. Notice, however, that 
individual differences in color perception still introduce a problem for this approach. For 
if, as a matter of fact, one and the same surface in the same circumstances can look one 
color to one normal observer and another color to another, then that surface cannot have 
an absolute color, only a relative one. However, as McLaughlin’s analysis shows (this 
volume), even though colors have to be perceiver-relative, they can still be intrinsic, that 
is, perceiver-independent properties of surfaces. One and the same surface reflectance is 
one color for one observer (in one circumstance, etc.), and another color for another 
observer (in another circumstance). Still, (1) we can specify particular colors in terms that 
do not make reference to any parameter of observers (e.g., redness := surface reflectance 
such-and-such), and (2) correspondingly, particular colors remain instantiated in the 
absence of observers. Neither of the latter two conditions is satisfied if color is thought to 
be photoreceptor excitation. 
 On both conceptions offered by Maloney, intrinsic colors depend, for their 
identity, on properties of, or relations to, observers. This is because individual differences 
in color perception make the notion of absolute color untenable (see McLaughlin, this 
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volume). This looks like a retreat of some sort since, intuitively, intrinsic colors are 
supposed not to depend on properties of (or relations to) observers; they are supposed to 
depend only on local properties of the distal object of perception – that’s what ‘intrinsic’ 
is meant to emphasize. This notion of intrinsic color falls with color absolutism. Still, 
Maloney’s second conception is compatible with a modified notion of intrinsic color: 
criteria (1) and (2). For, as McLaughlin (this volume) has argued, color objectivism does 
not require color absolutism. 
 Let us turn to the distinction between colors and color appearances. In another 
paper, Maloney (1999, pp. 409-414) discusses how the linear models framework relates 
to the opponent processing model of color perception. Briefly, the idea is that, following 
Stiles (1961, p. 264; Maloney, 1999, p. 410), for purposes of theoretical analysis color 
vision can be divided into two very general stages: (i) adaptational states of the pathways 
of chromatic processing, and (ii) the processes that adjust and modify these adaptational 
states. Color processing consists of a number of transformations of retinal signals 
including multiplicative scaling, additive shifts, and opponent recombination. The 
outcome of all these transformations is color appearance. These transformations contain 
certain parameters (coefficients for multiplicative scaling, constants for additive shift and 
so on) that are systematically modified by some characteristics of visual stimulation. The 
general schema is, transformations on receptor inputs at a given retinal location are 
influenced by previous retinal input and simultaneous input at other parts of the retina. 
This information about retinal surround determines the parameters for transformation of 
the cone signals at the retinal point under consideration. Now, the linear-models-based 
algorithms of surface reflectance estimation figure in adaptational control: they are part 
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of the transformations by which color appearance is reached from retinal input (Maloney, 
1999, p. 413). The first transformation of photoreceptor excitations is their multiplication 
by the lighting matrix Λε
-1
 (p. 13 IN THE DRAFT; see also Maloney, 1999, p. 413; 
Wandell, 1995, p. 307). The lighting matrix is illumination-dependent, and this 
transformation has the function of discounting the effect of illuminant changes, thereby 
achieving (approximate) color constancy. The result of this transformation is the visual 
representation of surface reflectance by linear-models weights. This representation then 
undergoes a further transformation that determines color appearance. This further 
transformation (function F in Maloney, 1999, p. 413) is arbitrary in the sense that, in 
principle, some species with trichromat color vision and photoreceptors of the same kind 
as ours could discriminate the same reflectance types as trichromat humans can, form the 
same linear-models-weights representations of them, yet still apply some different F 
function (second-site multiplicative attenuation, opponent recombination: Maloney, 1999, 
p. 410) to them so that despite the fact that such organisms discriminate the same 
reflectance ranges by their color experiences as we do, their color space (unique-binary 
division, similarity metrics) would be substantially different from ours. As Maloney says 
(1999, p. 413), in principle any one-to-one transformation of the linear-models-weights 
representation would equally well serve to determine color appearance; constraints on 
this transformation should come from further assumptions about how this second stage of 
color processing operates in humans. That is, particularities of surface reflectance 
estimation by color vision do not alone determine color appearance. Color appearance 
crucially depends on further transformations in the visual system that are independent of 
information about surface reflectance, but play a key role in shaping our color space. 
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This observation is extremely relevant to the evaluation of so-called 
representational externalist theories of color experience (Dretske, 1995 and Tye 1995, 
2000). Dretske and Tye claim, in effect, that the phenomenal character of color 
experience (roughly the same as color appearance) is straightforwardly determined by 
information about surface reflectance represented in color vision. Colors, in their view, 
are types of surface reflectances. Moreover, the representational content of color 
perceptions arises from the information that these perceptions carry about colors
4
, and the 
phenomenal character of color experiences is the same as their color content. Object color 
figures as the key component in color content, and color content just is color 
phenomenology: this means that object colors crucially determine what it is like to see 
them, i.e., the phenomenal characters of color experiences. Dretske’s and Tye’s views 
thus constitute the most straightforward denial of Lockean secondary quality theories. 
However, as we have seen, Maloney’s model has the consequence that intrinsic 
colors (surface reflectances) do not determine what it is like to see them. Therefore, if his 
general approach to color vision is right, then representational externalism about color 
phenomenology is wrong, and some internalist approach to phenomenal color experience 
has to be correct. (Internalism is the view that the phenomenal character of color 
experiences – that is, what it is like to see colors – is determined by what happens in the 
nervous system.
5
) Finally, note that nothing in what I have said questions the idea that 
color experience reliably tracks types of surface reflectance.
6
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